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Traditional superdistribution [15] approaches do not address
consumer privacy issues and also do not reliably prevent
the malicious consumer from indiscriminately copying and
redistributing the decryption keys or the decrypted content.
The layered nature of common digital content can also be
exploited to eﬃciently provide the consumer with choices
over the quality of the content, allowing him/her to pay less
for lower quality consumption and vice versa. This paper
presents a system that superdistributes encrypted layered
content and (1) allows the consumer to select a quality level
at which to decrypt and consume the content; (2) prevents
the merchant from knowing which exact content package
is consumed by the consumer, hence enhancing consumer
privacy; and (3) through trusted access control, prevents the
consumer from indiscriminately copying and redistributing
the decryption keys or the decrypted content, thus achieving
a form of digital rights management.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.0 [Software Engineering]: General—protection mech-
anisms; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy
Issues—privacy ; K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Elec-
tronic Commerce—distributed commercial transactions, in-
tellectual property, security ; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]:
Security and Protection—access controls; K.5.1 [Legal As-
pects of Computing]: Hardware/Software Protection—




DRM, digital distribution, privacy, copyrights, usage rights,
licensing, access control, trusted computing
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1. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of aﬀordable computing devices and broad-
band Internet access have led to increasing demand for mul-
timedia digital content which include news, movies and mu-
sic. Unlike traditional analog content which suﬀers from
quality degradation when copied, digital content can be per-
fectly duplicated and then easily disseminated. Such piracy
poses great diﬃculty in the enforcement of access rights and
usage policies of the digital content. A market without re-
liable copyright protection will not last long, hurting both
merchants and consumers in the long run. Superdistribu-
tion [15] is an eﬀective solution to the above challenge. It
encrypts the copyrighted content and distributes them via
low-cost high-bandwidth distribution channels to all poten-
tial consumers of the information. Examples of such dis-
tribution channels include oﬄine CD/DVD media, digital
broadcasts and broadband Internet connections that allow
for high-speed downloads as well as the increasingly popu-
lar peer-to-peer ﬁle transfers. As the copyrighted content is
cryptographically protected in a secure package, to gain ac-
cess to the content, the consumer will execute a key acquisi-
tion protocol between his/her device and a key server at mer-
chant side. The amount of data exchanged in this protocol is
in the range of only a few thousand bytes, so the consumer
may use a separate low-bandwidth low-cost connection to
acquire the key [13, 3]. To run a proﬁtable business, the
merchant will have to charge a fee for licensing its content
to the consumer. According to a recent ACNielsen study [1],
the most popular online payment methods are credit card,
bank transfer, cash-on-delivery and PayPal, all of which re-
quire the consumer to divulge identiﬁcation information to
the merchant. This implies that in our key acquisition pro-
cess, the consumer will have to submit his/her identiﬁcation
information1, such as credit card number and/or email ad-
dress. The release of any identiﬁcation information to the
merchant has implications on privacy.
Privacy has been a sensitive issue even before the advent
of the Internet. However, the Internet creates many new
threats to personal privacy and raises some unique privacy
concerns [6, 17, 5]. Information sent over the Internet may
1This is assuming that the merchant requires the consumer
to use a popular online payment method. As mentioned,
all of the current popular online payment methods require
the payer to provide identiﬁcation information. There are
of course payment methods which provide payer anonymity,
such as the unsuccessful eCash by DigiCash, but these meth-
ods are unpopular and relatively inconvenient to use.
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pass through dozens of diﬀerent routers and computer sys-
tems on the way to its destination. Each of these systems
may be capable of monitoring, capturing and storing on-
line communications. The highly connected nature of the
Internet makes it easy to automatically collect information
from many diﬀerent sources and compile a dossier on an
individual - his/her likes and dislikes, shopping patterns,
whereabouts and so on. Such data are a potentially valu-
able source of revenue for many businesses. Direct mar-
keters can mine the data to derive targeted lists of users
with similar preferences. The data can also be the source of
abuses that may cause embarrassment to the users who have
accessed sensitive or controversial materials online. While
Internet users are understandably concerned about privacy
when surﬁng the web, organizations are also taking cus-
tomers’ online privacy seriously to win their trust and to
be compliant with privacy legislations.
A number of tools and systems have been developed to
provide the Internet user anonymity while retrieving infor-
mation over the Internet. Onion Routing [19] and Crowds
[20] are two systems that uphold user anonymity in the In-
ternet. Onion Routing is a general purpose infrastructure for
anonymous communication over a public network. Crowds
is a system for protecting user anonymity on the web based
on the concept of “blending into a crowd” and operates by
grouping users into a large and geographically diverse group,
or crowd, that collectively issues HTTP requests on behalf
of its members. In Crowds, web servers are unable to trace
the source of a request because it is equally likely to have
originated from any member of the crowd, and even collab-
orating crowd members can not distinguish the originator of
a request from a member who is merely forwarding the re-
quest on behalf of another. The above anonymous systems
are useful for web surﬁng in which users are not required to
be identiﬁed and have no desire to do so. They are mostly
useful when users visit web sites and download free digital
products. However, in a superdistribution system, the con-
sumer has to submit to the key server his/her identiﬁcation
or authentication information (e.g. credit card numbers or
membership account information) in exchange for a cryp-
tographic key to unlock the content in the secure package.
Therefore, with respect to the issue of privacy protection in
superdistribution, our focus is not on consumer anonymity,
but on how to hide his/her shopping patterns as much as
possible from the key server and other data collectors. This
problem is in essence orthogonal to the anonymous commu-
nications problem.
Many digital content are organized as ordered layers, with
each layer being a quality increment over the set of its pre-
ceding layers. In other words, each additional layer further
reﬁnes the combined quality of its preceding layers. Ex-
amples of such layered content include JPEG2000 images,
MPEG videos, structured literature such as news articles
which present the most important information ﬁrst followed
by additional but lower priority information, and to a cer-
tain extent, even computer games with diﬀerent levels of
play.
Bao et al. proposed in [2] two protocols that prevent
the merchant from ﬁnding out which speciﬁc digital prod-
uct the consumer is purchasing. Zhu et al. proposed in
[25] a key scheme for layered access control of MPEG-4
FGS videos, based on a cryptographic hash function and
the Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement.
In this paper, we extend the techniques given in [2, 25]
and propose a system and the corresponding protocols to
protect consumers’ privacy in the superdistribution of gen-
eral layered content and to prevent a malicious consumer
from pirating the decrypted content. The proposed system
allows a consumer to disclose his/her identity information
to a key server in exchange for a digital product (or equiva-
lently, the cryptographic key to unlock the digital product),
but prohibits the key server from learning which speciﬁc
product the consumer obtains. With trusted access control,
the system prevents the consumer from copying and illegally
redistributing the unlocked digital product. Contributions
of this paper include (1) a technique for encrypting layered
content such that the consumer only needs to acquire a sin-
gle key from the server in order to consume a subset of the
layers; (2) a privacy-enhancing technique to prevent the key
server from knowing exactly which product the consumer
is purchasing, by logically grouping products of similar val-
ues and applying a commutative cipher; and (3) extending
a trusted virtual machine monitor (TVMM) with a shared
disk and applying it at consumer side to achieve trusted
access control.
In our system, to prevent a malicious consumer from pi-
rating the digital content and to achieve trusted access con-
trol, the consumer is required to run a reader application
(which may also be called the DRM client), e.g. image
viewer, within a closed-box virtual machine (VM) that is
monitored by a trusted virtual machine monitor (TVMM)
such as Terra [11]. Terra is a hardware-level virtual ma-
chine monitor (VMM) that multiplexes multiple VMs on a
single hardware platform, as opposed to a paravirtualiz-
ing VMM which requires the hosted operating system (OS)
to be ported or a binary translator VMM which trans-
lates instructions during runtime [11, 21]. Terra exposes
to each VM a virtual hardware interface which is identical
to that of the underlying physical hardware. Thus, an OS
running in the VM accesses the exposed virtual hardware
the same way it would access the actual physical hardware.
VMMs are not new. They have been heavily researched in
the 1960s, but were obviated in the 1980s when multitask-
ing operating systems became popular. However, research
interest in VMMs has recently been rekindled, with the fo-
cus shifted from merely multiplexing hardware to ensuring
security and reliability in software systems [21]. Both Intel
and AMD have announced plans to release their hardware-
level virtualization technologies targeted at both enterprise
servers and consumer desktops [7]. A TVMM such as Terra
runs on commodity hardware and exports two VM abstrac-
tions: open-box and closed-box. An open-box VM provides
the semantics of an open platform and can host a regular
commodity OS running commodity applications; a closed-
box VM provides secure isolation from other VMs and can
host a thin trusted OS running a trusted application. The
TVMM provides eﬃcient and secure isolation between the
VMs. Not even the platform owner can inspect or manip-
ulate the contents of a closed-box VM [11]. It is in such
a closed-box VM, extended with access to a shared disk,
that our reader application runs. The system we propose
is eﬃcient in its operations and do not impose unaccept-
able processing burdens on both the consumer and the key
server.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we present a basic superdistribution system for distributing
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Figure 1: A typical superdistribution system model.
scalable multimedia content. In Section 3 we describe the
privacy enhanced version of the system given in Section 2.
In Section 4 we further enhance the system with trusted
access control. Section 5 discusses some practical operation
issues of the proposed system and Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. BASIC SUPERDISTRIBUTION OF
MULTIMEDIA CONTENT
Superdistribution applies to all types of digital content,
such as multimedia, data and software. With multimedia
content accounting for a signiﬁcant portion of all Internet
traﬃc, we hereby focus our discussion on such content with-
out loss of generality. The superdistribution system model
under consideration is shown in Figure 1.
The system operation consists of the following high-level
steps:
1. Generation of Secure Package: A content producer or
authorized merchant encrypts a digital product, and
places the resulting ciphertext in a secure package.
2. Distribution of Secure Package: The merchant distri-
butes the package to the consumers. Since the digi-
tal product is protected by encryption, all conceivable
channels of content distribution can now be used, in-
cluding digital cable TV, satellite broadcast, CD/DVD-
ROM publishing, and of course general downloading
as well as P2P ﬁle transfer over the Internet. The
keys for decrypting the secure packages are forwarded
securely from the merchant to an on-line key server,
which serves as an agent for multiple content providers.
3. Key Acquisition: A consumer who desires to access
a digital product sends his/her request together with
authentication information to the key server, which re-
sponds with the appropriate decryption keys according
to consumer’s privilege or amount of payment.
In order to achieve scalable and ﬂexible access control to
encrypted content, generation of the secure packages should
take the data structure of the protected content into con-
sideration. We illustrate this point using JPEG2000 [22, 18]
as an example. JPEG2000 is an emerging ISO standard for
still image compression designed to address most of the lim-
itations of the original JPEG standard. It has a remarkable
“compress once, decompress many ways” property, in that it
supports extraction of transcoded images with various res-
olutions, quality layers and regions-of-interest, all from the
same compressed image code stream. Exploiting this prop-
erty, applications are able to disclose only the required image
data (known as transcode in JPEG2000) of a particular code
M0 = {L0} M1 = {L0|L1} M2 = {L0|L1|L2}
Figure 2: A JPEG2000 code stream displayed in 3
qualities.
stream for any target consumer based on his/her privileges
or capabilities.
Data in a JPEG2000 code stream can be arranged in qual-
ity layers. As an illustration, consider a code stream with
three layers M = {L0, L1, L2}, where L0 is the base layer,
and L1 is the ﬁrst enhancement layer and L2 is the sec-
ond enhancement layer. Let x|y denote the concatenation
of x and y. The transcoded images of basic quality, mod-
erate quality and high quality are represented respectively
by M0 = {L0}, M1 = {L0|L1} and M2 = {L0|L1|L2}, as
illustrated in Figure 2.
We denote a general JPEG2000 code stream as M =
{L0, L1, . . . , LI} and denote its transcoded image of ith
quality as Mi = {L0|L1| . . . |Li}, i = 0, 1, . . . , I . To produce
a secure package for code stream M, the merchant proceeds
as follows:
Generation of Secure Package
1. Choose a random key kI and compute ki−1 = h(ki),
fori = I, I − 1, . . . , 2, 1, where h() is a one-way hash
function. Hence, there are a total of I + 1 keys. How-
ever, only kI needs to be stored in the key server.
2. Encrypt each Li with key ki to obtain ciphertext Ci =
e(ki, Li), i = 0, 1, . . . , I , where e(x, y) is a symmetric
key encryption of message y using key x. An example
of such an encryption algorithm is AES [9].
3. Construct the secure package of code stream M as <
B, {Ci; i = 0, 1, . . . , I} >, where B is the metadata of
the code stream which contains information such as
the code stream identiﬁer, title, producer, number of
quality layers, and usage rules.
The application of the hash function chain in Step 1 re-
duces the key management overhead, which will be discussed
shortly. The secure package constructed in Step 3 is to be
distributed freely to all the potential consumers.
Now, suppose that a consumer wishes to access the ith-
quality transcoded image of the code stream. He/she will
execute the following key acquisition protocol with the key
server to acquire the corresponding key. In the description
of the key acquisition protocol, and henceforth, we use the
term “consumer” interchangeably with the term “reader ap-
plication”.
Key Acquisition
1. The consumer sends his/her authentication data, the
code stream identiﬁer (which the consumer obtains
from B in the secure package) and the requested the
quality (i.e. the ith quality) to the key server. At this
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point, the key server authenticates the consumer or
requires the consumer to make payment.
2. The key server, using the code stream identiﬁer as in-
dex, retrieves the corresponding kI from its database.
The key server then computes kI−1 = h(kI), kI−2 =
h(kI−1), . . . , ki = h(ki+1), and sends ki to the con-
sumer.
3. Upon receiving ki, the consumer computes ki−1 =
h(ki), ki−2 = h(ki−1), . . ., k0 = h(k1). He/she then
uses the keys k0, k1, . . . , ki to respectively decrypt C0,
C1, . . . , Ci to get the desired transcoded image Mi =
{L0|L1| . . . |Li}.
It is noteworthy that our secure package is constructed
such that consumers can obtain multiple transcoded im-
ages from the single package. This design fully preserves
JPEG2000’s “compress once, decompress many ways” prop-
erty. It is also interesting to note that, due to the application
of hash chaining, we require only one key to be sent from
the key server to the consumer, regardless of the quality
of the requested transcoded image. Doing so reduces both
the storage requirement for storing keys and the amount of
data transmitted. The reductions are especially signiﬁcant
when the number of quality layers is large. As a side note,
JPEG2000 supports up to 65,535 quality layers in a single
code stream. We also note that the above technique can be
extended to video streams, such as Motion JPEG2000 [10]
and MPEG4 streams [14], as well as other digital products
with layered content.
3. PRIVACY ENHANCED SUPER-
DISTRIBUTION
In this section we present a privacy enhanced superdis-
tribution system which (a) allows a consumer to disclose
his/her identity information (such as user account informa-
tion or credit card number) to the key server in exchange
for a decryption key of a digital product; (b) prevents the
key server from learning which speciﬁc decryption key (and
hence identifying the product) the consumer intends to ob-
tain; and (c) prevents the consumer from obtaining more
than what he/she deserves to obtain.
The proposed system is an extension of the technique
given in [2], which is designed for generic content. Our ex-
tension deals with the eﬃcient superdistribution of multi-
layered content. Our system employs the following commu-
tative cipher known as the Pohlig-Hellman exponentiation
cipher [16]. Let p be a prime number such that compu-
tation of discrete logarithm modulo p is infeasible, a, 0 <
a < p − 1, a random number which is coprime to p − 1,
and b = 1
a
mod (p− 1). Let X, 0 < X < p, be a message.
Then the encryption of X using the encryption key a is
D = Xa mod p and the decryption of D using the decryp-
tion key b is X = Db mod p. It is easy to see that this cipher
is commutative.
Assume that the content merchant has many JPEG2000
code streams, each supporting I + 1 transcoded images of
diﬀerent qualities. The merchant ﬁrst sets up I+1 commuta-
tive ciphers. Let pi be a prime, ai, co-prime to pi−1 and 0 <
ai < pi − 1, be an encryption key and bi = 1ai mod (pi − 1)
be the corresponding decryption key, i = 0, 1, . . . , I . We will
use the same ai and bi to respectively encrypt and decrypt
the ith layer of every code stream. The merchant oper-
ates as follows to generate a secure package for a particular
JPEG2000 code stream M = {L0, L1, . . . , LI}. As in the
previous section, we use e(x, y) to denote the encryption of
message y using key x with a symmetric key cipher.
Generation of Secure Package
1. Choose a random key kI and compute ki−1 = h(ki),
for i = I, I − 1, . . . , 2, 1.
2. Encrypt Li with key ki to obtain Ci = e(ki, Li), and
encrypt ki with key ai to obtain Di = (ki)
ai mod
pi, i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1, I . Note that even for another
code stream, with obviously a diﬀerent key ki, the
same ai is used in encrypting that key.
3. Construct the secure package of the code stream as
< B, {Ci, pi,Di; i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , I} >, where B is the
metadata of the code stream.
All the secure packages are distributed freely to the con-
sumers. Assuming that a consumer wants to access a par-
ticular transcoded image Mi (of i
th quality) from the secure
package of M , he/she will execute the following protocol
with the key server to acquire the corresponding key:
Key Acquisition
1. The consumer randomly picks a number r, where 0 <
r < pi − 1, computes s = 1r mod (pi − 1) and U =
(Di)
s mod pi. He/she then sends U , his/her authenti-
cation data and the requested quality (i.e., the value
i for the ith quality) to the key server. Note that the
code stream identiﬁer does not need to be sent. At
this point, the key server can require the consumer to
make payment.
2. The key server computes V = Ubi mod pi and returns
V to the consumer.
3. The consumer recovers the key ki = V
r mod pi, com-
putes kj recursively from ki using the hash function
h(), j = i− 1, . . . , 1, 0, and decrypts Cj , j = 0, 1, . . . , i,
to obtain the desired transcoded image Mi = {L0|L1|
. . . |Li}.
Note that U = (Di)
s mod pi = ((ki)
ai)s mod pi, V =
Ubi modpi = (ki)
s mod pi; therefore V
r mod pi = ki is
the key desired by the consumer. This protocol achieves
information-theoretical security for consumers. The key server
only knows U and is not able to derive Di, and thus un-
able to know which decryption key is requested by the con-
sumer. Hence, the key server only knows that the consumer
requested a code stream of a particular quality, but does
not know which particular code stream the consumer has
requested. This achieves our design objective on protecting
consumer privacy.
A practical consideration for the merchant is that the
secure packages, which are distributed as a logical group,
should each have a similar ﬁnancial value. As there is no
way for the merchant to know which package the consumer
is using, the only practical measure is for the merchant to ﬁx
the same price for each ith-quality layer across all the pack-
ages. This constraint should not be too limiting if there are
suﬃcient packages of similar values.
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4. ACHIEVING TRUSTED ACCESS
CONTROL
Thus far, we have described a privacy-enhanced superdis-
tribution system that prevents the merchant from knowing
what the consumer purchases, and has the ﬂexibility of al-
lowing the consumer to select a quality level at which to
consume the content and pay in accordance to the selected
quality, both without imposing impractical implementation
burdens. However, a malicious consumer may break the lo-
cal software to obtain ki and pass the key to others. In this
section, to prevent software tampering, we further enhance
the system to include trusted access control at the consumer
side.
To achieve trusted access control, we require the consumer
to run a trusted virtual machine monitor (TVMM) such
as Terra [11] on commodity PC hardware equipped with a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [23]. Many new commod-
ity desktop PCs and laptops have already been equipped
with TPMs, including those from Dell, Fujitsu, HP, Toshiba
and Lenovo [24]. IDC predicts that by 2010 TPM adoption
will increase to near ubiquity for both business and con-
sumer PC hardware [8]. Based on open industry speciﬁca-
tion, the TPM has two components: a secure cryptographic
microcontroller similar to a smartcard microcontroller and
a software interface for TPM-aware applications. An im-
portant aspect of the TPM is that it is the key enabler for
remote attestation. With remote attestation, an application
can authenticate itself, as well as the OS it is running on and
the hardware platform hosting the OS, to a remote party.
To perform the authentication, the application requests the
OS for an endorsement. The OS in turn requests the lower
layer, which could be a TVMM or a boot loader, for an en-
dorsement. This goes on until the TPM-equipped hardware
platform at the lowest layer is reached. Then, starting at
the lowest layer, each layer signs a hash of the upper layer,
building a hash chain all the way up to the application. The
entire certiﬁcate chain is sent to the remote party, which sub-
sequently veriﬁes each certiﬁcate and checks that the hash
value of each layer corresponds to the known trusted value
stored at the remote party side. When veriﬁed, the appli-
cation in question is trusted to behave as expected by the
remote party. With direct anonymous attestation [4], the
veriﬁer only learns that the consumer uses a TPM but not
which particular one. This is a good-to-have property, but
not important in our system.
The TVMM exports an open-box and a closed-box VM
abstractions. The consumer can continue to run a commod-
ity OS such as Linux or Microsoft Windows within an open-
box VM. This VM exposes the same semantics as the under-
lying general-purpose hardware platform, such that the OS
and the installed applications can run as though they were
running right on top of the hardware platform. The con-
sumer will use this open-box VM for his normal computing
activities, which can certainly include using the web browser
and tools such as P2P ﬁle sharing software to download en-
crypted packages from the merchant. He/she may also run
multiple instances of open-box VMs, but the TVMM will
ensure that each VM is run in isolation and each uses a ded-
icated virtual hard drive independently for storage. Within
a closed-box VM, a thin trusted OS is hosted and the trusted
reader application installed. The reader application enforces
the usage policy dictated by the merchant, which may in-
clude how many times the consumer can consume the con-
tent and when he/she can do so. Because the main purpose
of the thin OS is to run only the single reader application,
it does not require multitasking capability and hence can
have a small footprint. Figure 3 illustrates how the VMs
run within the TVMM.
In addition to providing the same hardware interface as
open-box VMs, the closed-box VM has access to a narrow
interface provided by the TVMM for performing attestation
[11]. Further to that, we provide a separate narrow interface
with ﬁle IO functions for all the VMs to access a shared
disk. In a traditional TVMM such as Terra, inter-process
communication (IPC) between VMs is not supported, other
than by emulating a network [12]. This means that there is
previously no way for VMs to communicate or share data
intrinsically. With the introduction of a shared disk, we
allow the consumer to download the secure package ﬁles into
the shared disk from within the open-box VM environment,
so that the ﬁles can be accessed by the reader application in
the closed-box VM later. The TVMM will ensure that the
VMs access the shared disk in a mutually exclusive manner.
The following are the steps that the consumer will go
through to consume the superdistributed content with trusted
access control:
1. Download Secure Package: In the open-box VM, the
consumer uses a convenient method to obtain the su-
perdistributed secure package. For example, he/she
could do so through downloading from a website. The
package ﬁle is stored in the shared disk.
2. Perform remote attestation: From within the open-
box VM, the consumer will perform a context switch to
the closed-box VM. There, he/she will run the reader
application, which will initiate an SSL handshaking
process to authenticate the merchant key server and
to establish a session key for secure communication.
Remote attestation is subsequently executed with the
server to authenticate the entire software stack at con-
sumer side, from hardware and ﬁrmware up to the boot
loader, TVMM and the reader application. Through
the narrow attestation API provided by the TVMM,
the reader application will call an “Endorse” function
which triggers a series of attestation-related events, as
mentioned in detail earlier in this section. The result-
ing hash chain is then presented to the server. The
server has to verify all the certiﬁcates and hash values,
before trusting that the reader application will behave
as expected.
3. Key acquisition: The consumer will now execute the
key acquisition protocol with the key server, as de-
scribed in detail in the previous section, except that
now the messages are exchanged between the trusted
reader application and the key server through the es-
tablished secure SSL communication channel. It is im-
portant that key acquisition process be protected by
the SSL session. Otherwise, the key acquisition pro-
cess would be susceptible to man-in-the-middle attack,
in that immediately after attestation is completed, a
malicious consumer could intercept the insecure com-
munication channel and replace the reader application
with a misbehaving one running on another machine,
hence bypassing the merchant’s usage policy. At the
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Figure 3: The open-box VM and closed-box VM running on top of the TVMM, both accessing the shared
disk.
end of this key acquisition protocol, the reader applica-
tion will have decrypted the package retrieved from the
shared disk and obtained the user-desired transcoded
image.
4. Consume package: The reader application will allow
the consumer to view the transcoded image in accor-
dance to the usage policy dictated by the merchant.
The simplest usage policy will require the consumer to
always perform attestation and key acquisition (which
may include payment) whenever he/she wants to con-
sume the package. In this case, access control data
is not stored at consumer side. Alternatively, during
key acquisition, the key server can send a policy ﬁle
together with the decryption key to the reader appli-
cation. The policy ﬁle can contain access control in-
formation such as the number of times the consumer
can access the decrypted data. This ﬁle will be stored
by the TPM in sealed storage, which is accessible only
when the reader application has been attested. The
consumer can run the same reader application to con-
sume the data without having to perform attestation
and key acquisition, as long as the usage policy allows
so.
Successful attestation ensures that the consumer is run-
ning a reader application that is trusted by the merchant
to behave in accordance to the merchant’s speciﬁcation. It
also ensures that the thin OS on which the reader applica-
tion runs is also trusted not to misbehave, such as not dy-
namically modifying the reader application. The TVMM,
boot loader, ﬁrmware and hardware are all similarly trusted
to behave as expected. Hence, the merchant can be sure
that the decryption keys as well as the decrypted content
do not leave the trusted environment. That is, the keys and
content will not be copied and distributed to a third party.
5. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Communication and Computational Overhead: First we
consider communication overhead. In the original superdis-
tribution system, the merchant sends {B, kI} to the key
server for every digital product while in the privacy en-
hanced system only {bi, i = 0, 1, . . . , I} are sent from the
merchant to the key server. The amount of overhead in
the former is in proportional to the number of products
while that in the latter is ﬁxed. In the privacy enhanced
system, additional overhead to convey keying information,
{pi, Di; i = 0, 1, . . . , I}, is introduced in a secure package.
However, this overhead is not an important concern since it
is distributed over high bandwidth and low cost channels.
Next, we compare computational overhead between the two
systems. To answer a consumer request, the key server in the
original system carries out a hash chain computation while
that in the privacy enhanced system performs a decryption
operation of the commutative cipher. Both operations are
considered low cost for a server machine. In the trusted
version of the system, the additional attestation and SSL
communication requirements also do not impose a heavy
computational burden on the server.
Sales Statistics Collection: We note that in practice it is
often necessary for content providers or clearing houses to
know the sales statistics of particular products, such as the
number of copes sold in a day. Fortunately, it is possible
to achieve both user privacy protection and sales statistics
collection at the same time [2].
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a system and the corre-
sponding protocols for privacy enhanced superdistribution
with trusted access control. We presented our system us-
ing multimedia content as an illustrative example, but the
technique applies to all layered content types. Privacy pro-
tection gives users peace of mind. Hence, everything else
being equal, content providers who respect user privacy are
more attractive to users than those who do not.
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